The military’s propaganda and social media usage patterns
Last updated
Last updated
During the first press conference organised by the State Administrative Council (SAC) on 16 February in Naypyitaw, a journalist from the pro-military media outlet Thuriya Nay Wun commented that Myanmar’s military had done much less to interfere with the country’s politics than the neighbouring Thai military had, citing that whereas Thailand had undergone numerous military coups, Myanmar had only seen three since the country’s independence. The irony of that statement, of course, is that the Tatmadaw has only ever needed to stage three coups, since their re-established stranglehold on power has lasted each time for decades.
Figure 1: Moe Hein, a journalist from Thuriya Nay Wun, justifying the coup at the first press conference organised by the State Administrative Council. (Source: Eleven Media Group)
The incident at the press conference says a great deal about the way the military’s propaganda machine operates: the elaborate stage setting for delivering their version of the truth, the shallow contradictory reasoning that the public can easily see through and the inability of anyone to point out said contradictions under threat of violence. And yet it is also illustrative of the post-coup era as a return to a familiar and terrifying Orwellian past.
As this section will explain, the military relies on a combination of old tactics and new methods to claim legitimacy of the coup and coerce people into following their bidding. Interestingly, it is now clear that they had already put their machinery in motion in the months leading up to the coup. Armed with experience from 1988 and access to new online tools, the military prepared to take over the country both physically and mentally.
One of the very first things the military did in the early hours of 1 February was to secure control of people’s access to information. Internet and mobile connections were down and the military had taken control of all broadcast media. People were left in complete information darkness as NLD leaders were arrested and tanks rolled into the major cities across the country. No one knew precisely what had happened before an announcement of the coup was broadcast on state television.
Although internet and mobile connections were later restored, the military has continued to take control of communication and information channels. Over periods of time and in strategic places across the country, people have had limited access to the internet and/or no or very limited access to mobile networks. At the same time, it has become increasingly difficult for the country’s independent media to operate, with media losing their licenses and distribution channels and their staff getting harassed, threatened and even arrested.
Figure 2: Internet suppression after 1 February. (Source: Reuters)
These classical manoeuvres have been an integrated part of the military’s so-called “four cuts” counter-insurgency strategy for decades. The strategy involves routing insurgents by cutting food supplies, sources of funding, intelligence and support from the civilian population. In practice, the four cuts have resulted in a brutal reign of terror that the military has inflicted on civilian populations for decades, especially in ethnic areas as was observed during the Rohingya crisis in 2017. However, in the post-coup era of 2021, the strategy has been applied in Bamar majority heartlands, making the general population acutely aware of the military’s capabilities.
Figure 3: A tweet pointing out the military’s four cuts tactic. (Source: Kim Joliffe)
Apart from cutting the intelligence resources of the protest movement at the level of internet connectivity, the military has also made wide use of propaganda and disinformation – through both their own media channels and on social media.
Even if the military’s disinformation and propaganda efforts so far have not been successful in swaying the main part of the civilian population, the country currently faces a continuing war of attrition, where pro-military propaganda is likely to target the general population’s existing prejudices and fears, ranging from distrust of ethnic minorities and foreigners, deep-seated misogyny, dogmatic religious beliefs, generational divides and a nascent public sphere where freedom of speech has only existed for less than a decade.
In the days leading up to the coup and in the first few days following the coup, there were many pro-military and pro-USDP protesters on the streets of Yangon and other cities who were trying to provoke the general public’s anger. As noted by journalist Cape Diamond in a Twitter post (Figure 4 below), military supporters burned the flag of the NLD during a street protest in late January. The prevailing view from the public was that these so-called military supporters were paid by the military and/or the USDP and that they were not genuine expressions of political support.
Figure 4: Military supporters burned the flag of the NLD during a street protest. (Source: Cape Diamond)
Nonetheless, there were also rallies held where so-called military supporters gathered to celebrate the military’s role in upholding “race and religion”. This phrase is often used in nationalist circles as a synonym for the Bamar race and Buddhism, implicitly relegating Myanmar’s other ethnic groups, languages and religions to a secondary status at best. There were also reports on social media of pro-military protesters armed with swords and spears, ready for violent confrontations with anti-coup protesters.
Figure 5: Military-supporting rallies after the coup. (Source: Myanmar News)
However, the first week following the coup did not see large anti-coup protests in the streets. Instead, the first signs of the public spontaneously protesting the coup came in the form of banging pots and pans at night, alongside the medical workers’ first act of defiance that kick-started the civil disobedience movement. We will look into the protest movement’s tactics in the next section of the report, but the lack of protests in the beginning was something that the military had not anticipated – and says a lot about the people’s knowledge of the military’s ways of operating.
While the pro-military rallies faded soon after, the clashes in the streets with anti-coup protesters that the military had allegedly been preparing for did not materialise in the first week. The public knew that this was exactly what the military had hoped to see and spontaneously organised to show their dissent in ways that were manifestly peaceful – such as banging pots and pans – and avoided any chances of clashes with military supporters. Orchestrating violence in the streets between civilians and subsequently stepping in to “restore order” is a trope the military has used many times in the past decades, and the public knew all too well that they were doing the same thing this time around.
Figure 6: Leaked video of USDP recruiting paid protesters at “20,000 kyats for a full truck” of protesters. (Source: DVB Burmese)
Figure 7: A tweet reporting the violence initiated by pro-military mobs after a Tatmadaw-supporting rally. (Source: A tweet from Matthew Tostevin)
Perhaps the most prominent examples of tactics from 1988 that were reused in the exact same way in 2021 were the attempted arsons and poisonings committed by using recently released prisoners. In 1988, there were several well-documented cases of individuals who were caught while trying to poison water supplies or attempting arson. Many of these were then reportedly killed by angry mobs. These cases were reported in the newspapers at the time and are widely believed to have been perpetrated by released prisoners that the military sent out into neighbourhoods to commit crimes and incite fear.
Figure 8: A post from an anti-coup account warning about the old tactics used by the military by showing newspaper articles from August and September 1988. (Source: PJW)
The gruesome violence involved in the mob’s killing of these arsonists and poisoners is often brought up in pro-military propaganda on social media, citing it as proof that the 1988 protests devolved into chaos and anarchy, and that the NLD and the pro-democracy protest movement should bear the responsibility for these violent crimes. One of the most commonly seen tropes used in the military propagandists’ narrative is that pro-democracy protests are intent on destabilising the country, intentionally causing chaos and breaking apart the unity, law and order that has been established by the military.
Figure 9: A pro-military post from June 2020 describing in shocking detail the 1988 case of a woman who was accused of poisoning. After getting caught, that woman was beheaded by angry mobs. (Source: A group post at မန္တလေး သိချိန်တန်ပြီ)
During the weekend of 12–14 February, the threat of attempted poisoning and arson once again became widespread. Following the amnesty of more than 20,000 prisoners on 12 February, in conjunction with invocation of article 419 to revoke articles 5, 7 and 8 of the 2008 constitution – which granted authorities the right to arrest without warrants, search houses and detain people for more than 24 hours, among other violations of human rights – the public was well prepared for what was about to follow. As predicted, that weekend saw multiple reports of citizens’ arrests being made to catch individuals who attempted arson and poisonings, who were often drugged, some with prison release papers in their pockets. Even video evidence of children being drugged and told to commit crimes has emerged.
Figure 10: A news story about the pardon granted to the prisoners by the junta regime on 12 February. (Source: Mratt Kyaw Thu)
Figure 11: Suspicious people were caught and detained by local residents nationwide after the military junta’s release of prisoners. (Source: A Tweet from Moe)
Figure 12: A widely circulated video of a child who confessed that the military injected him with drugs and paid him to commit illicit actions. (Source: Aung Kyaw Min)
The public’s suspicions that the military orchestrated these attacks were further validated by more video and photographic evidence of police who were seen right next to the crime scenes but did not intervene. Whereas in 1988 the public was caught unaware, resulting in fear, paranoia and cases of mob violence, in 2021 the public was incredibly effective at using social media to document and spread evidence of the resurgence of these tactics. As a result, people, for the most part, remained calm and did not fall prey to the violent and fearful outcomes that the military was trying to provoke.
Figure 13: A tweet pointing out that police officers might have been colluding with criminals. (Source: Phone Thiri Kyaw)
Despite there being no ensuing mob violence from the poisoning and arson attempts, the military and their supporters still used this trope to justify their increasingly violent and deadly crackdowns. Video footage of protesters throwing rocks at police barricades in Naypyitaw was shown during the SAC’s first official press conference on 16 February, and pro-military social media accounts regularly posted videos that used footage of protesters shooting makeshift air guns to indicate that the protesters were resorting to violence.
Figure 14: Footage shown at the SAC press conference to discredit peaceful protests. (Source: Weekly Eleven)
Figure 15: A post from a military supporter alleging the protesters are violent. (Source: Удачных Родов)
With its own media channels and an active presence on social media (including a large following of pro-military supporters), the military has always attempted to push its version of “the truth” to the Myanmar public. Its efforts in this regard have only intensified following the coup, with the military’s communication and information units doing their utmost to create narratives in support of the coup and the new leadership.
As an example, military-controlled media was quick to start reporting as if everything had gone back to normal. Newspapers and television news were full of stories showing how the country’s economy was flourishing and how in control the military was of the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic.
The same media have also done their utmost to downplay and discredit the protest movement while also attempting to debunk stories and coverage from local independent media (and even international media) whenever they presented a version of the conflict not in line with the military’s narrative.
In early May, the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw officially announced the formation of the People’s Defence Force (PDF), composed of new recruits from the civilian population, to begin an armed resistance against the Tatmadaw. In May and June, there were clashes in multiple places across the country where local PDF groups fought against the military.
Figure 16: Mission statements of the People Defence Force. (Source: Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw - CRPH)
Pro-military social media accounts often post about the PDF in a condescending way, saying that they are bound to fail because the militia groups are inexperienced and consist of naive Generation Z youth who are misled into thinking that they can defeat the well-trained and well-equipped Tatmadaw troops. Many posts include pictures and accounts of how young PDF fighters have been injured or captured, often with a tone that sounds sympathetic because they are seen as being duped into risking their lives on behalf of the NLD, CRPH and NUG, who military supporters believe are pulling the strings.
Figure 17: A pro-military page asserting that the guerrilla warfare of the People Defence Force will be futile. (Source: ရွှေပြည်တော်)
Figure 18: A pro-military account celebrating the arrest of PDF members. (Source: A group post at ျမန္ျပည္ခ်စ္)
Figure 19: A veteran denouncing the PDF. (Source: ဦးမဂၤလာ)
Following the countrywide protests in 1988, young people from all over Myanmar also decided to take up arms to join the armed resistance against the military junta. The All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) was formed and they were trained by ethnic armed organisations to fight alongside them. The military’s propaganda during this time also targeted youth who had joined the armed resistance in the same condescending tone that can be found in the pro-military social media posts described above. In fact, a famous propaganda movie called Puppy Ma (ပါပီမ) was made in the early 90s to portray the plight of a group of young people who decided to travel to the border areas to take up arms. The plot involves these young people eventually succumbing to tragic endings such as death and exploitation, and regretting their mistaken decision to join the armed resistance.
Figure 20: A scene from early 90s propaganda movie Puppy Ma. (Source: MgTinLin)
Many of the military’s propaganda moves seem like they were lifted out of a playbook from 1988, but there are also tactics that bear an uncanny resemblance to a more recent atrocity – the “clearance operations” against Rohingya communities in 2017, for which Min Aung Hlaing and the military have been charged with genocide in the International Court of Justice.
Figure 21: The military’s burning of Rohingya villages in 2017. (Source: Reuters)
Figure 22: A tweet comparing the Kinma Village burning in June 2021 with the burning of Rohingya villages in 2017. (Source: Joe Freeman’s Tweet)
On 15 June, military forces set fire to the whole of Kinma Village in Pauk Township. While most of the population was able to flee, some elderly residents were left trapped inside their houses and subsequently died in the fire. This incident follows the so-called scorched earth technique (a military strategy that aims to destroy any assets useful to the enemy, including supplies, shelter and communication) used by the military against hundreds of Rohingya communities in 2017, as well as against Karen and other ethnic communities over the past decades.
On top of committing these violent atrocities, the military propaganda ratcheted up the cruelty by accusing others of being the real perpetrators. In the case of the Rohingya, it was claimed that the Rohingya themselves set fire to their villages to pretend that they were being persecuted, and in the case of Kinma Village, the military claimed that it was the People’s Defence Force and NLD supporters who had set fire to the village. Posts appeared on social media and on official state media claiming to debunk alleged misinformation from international news outlets CNN and Reuters that the village had been burned down by the military.
Figure 23: A military-run outlet refuting the military’s role of Kinma Village fire. (Source: Yin Min Myint Swe; Global New Light of Myanmar)
Figure 24: A propaganda article in the state-owned newspaper regarding the Kinma Village fire. (Source: Myanmar Light Newspaper)
State newspapers also published articles complete with manipulated photographs of SAC soldiers rescuing elderly villagers from the burning village and national news broadcasts on the military-controlled Myawaddy channel included video testimony from a local monk claiming that the village was indeed burned down by NLD supporters. The monk in the video compared the NLD to the Taliban for being the only groups in the world who would burn down villages, bizarrely bringing up the trope of the NLD being as dangerous as Islamic extremists.
Figure 25: Video from the military-controlled Myawaddy channel in which a monk claims Kinma Village was burned down by the NLD. (Source: M Thaw)
The incident involving the burning of Kinma Village is not the only instance where the military accused the anti-coup protesters and/or the NLD of atrocities that they themselves had committed, but it is definitely a textbook case of this tactic. This tactic is often used when overwhelming evidence of an atrocity leaves no room for blanket denial. Another example of this is the case of the murder of protester Ma Kyal Sin in Mandalay. Even though there was video evidence clearly showing the moment that she was shot in the head, official propaganda states that she was actually shot by a fellow protester, and even went so far as to exhume her dead body from the grave to perform an autopsy to attempt to “prove” their bogus claim.
Another tactic that the military used in the aftermath of the 1988 coup was to show that they had the country’s multiple ethic groups' best interests at heart, and whereas civilian governments were unable to bring peace to the ethnic regions, their regime was able to do so.
In the last week of February 2021, the SAC arranged for 1,086 Myanmar nationals living as refugees in Malaysia to be repatriated back to Myanmar. Most of them were Chin and Kachin. Min Aung Hlaing’s first trips outside of Naypyitaw in late March were to the border town of Tachileik, which is next to the Wa Self-Administered Zone, controlled by the United Wa State Army, one of the most well-armed ethnic armed groups in the country. These moves mirror the tactics used by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in the years following the 1988 coup, when the junta reached out to appease ethnic minority groups and gain their favour. Even Rohingya political parties were allowed to compete in the 1990 elections and won some seats in Rakhine state. The early 1990s were also marked by ceasefire agreements with many ethnic armed groups, orchestrated by Kin Nyunt, the head of military intelligence at the time.
Figure 26: A news piece about the repatriation of Myanmar refugees from Malaysia. (Source: ေနျပည္ေတာ္ အထူးသတင္းရပ္ဝန္း)
However, these gestures by the military are mainly performative and opportunistic since the root cause of much of the conflict in the ethnic regions of Myanmar is the Tatmadaw’s own policies and oppressive practices. These concessions can be taken away whenever the military feels that they are not working in their favour, as, for instance, could be seen in the breakdown of the ceasefire agreement with the KNU/KNLA in March 2021. In addition, any kind of outreach to ethnic minorities by the military is still based firmly around the idea of ethnonationalism, with a strict demarcation of who gets to be in the official list of “taing yin thar”, or national races. For example, pro-military Facebook posts were careful to point out that the repatriation of Myanmar refugees from Malaysia consisted only of Myanmar citizens and did not include any “Bengalis” (the derogatory term for Rohingya).
Activists in the pro-democracy movement are also vilified on the basis of race and religion. For example, Wai Moe Naing, who is a famous activist from the town of Monywa, was attacked on social media based on his Muslim faith. There were posts accusing him of being a member of ARSA (Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army), and after he was arrested in mid-April, there were posts that claimed that he held Myanmar women captive in his house and committed sexual assault and murder – feeding into a racist trope that Muslim men are preying on Bamar Buddhist women.
Figure 27: A post accusing activist Wai Moe Naing of being a member of ARSA. (Source: ျမတ္ေသာဧကရီ)
Figure 28: A fabricated propaganda post claiming that weapons and explosives were found in the basement of Wai Moe Naing’s home and portraying him as a rapist. (Source: Ba Gyi Aung)
Ethnonationalism also extends to accusations that certain people from the NLD government and activists of non-Bamar ethnicity are supported by foreign powers. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is an example of a foreign organisation that has been brought up in many pro-military posts. Some posts accuse the 88 Generation activist Min Ko Naing of receiving millions of dollars of support from the OIC and George Soros (philanthropist and founder of the Open Society Foundations) and having quietly distributed billions of dollars to Muslims in Myanmar with the goal of creating divisions within the country and establishing a new Islamic state.
Figure 29: A military supporter stating that the Tatmadaw saved the country from being assaulted by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. (Source: Ye Yint Htet)
Figure 30: A propaganda post stating that OIC, the West and George Soros plotted to intervene the politics of Myanmar. (Source: Voice of Native)
Figure 31: A pro-military post accusing NUG ministers of being terrorists. (Source: A group post at ထမိန်ခြုံနှိမ်နင်းရေးအထူးတပ်ဖွဲ့ (၂) )
As a part of its strategy to quell opposition movements, the military is historically known to apply scare and shock tactics. Ongoing anti-coup movements are no exception to these tactics. Since the coup, the military used social media to instigate fear, expecting that this would prevent people from joining protests, participating in the CDM or posting anti-coup commentary on Facebook. Since 1 February, the military, state-run media and its supporters have used several different tactics on multiple issues to intimidate the public – and the protesters in particular. This section will examine some significant scare and shock tactics deployed.
The military had not been in charge for long before they started suggesting and making alterations to the legal system. The regime’s release of a Cyber Security Law draft on 6 February, five days into the coup, sent shock waves through Myanmar’s social media scene. According to the draft, the military would be surveilling online content to a far greater degree and the SAC would hold the power to arrest activists, citizens and media showing any signs of critique of the SAC and the coup.
Figure 32: A review of the draft Cyber Security Law. (Source: Matthew Tostevin’s Tweet)
For many young people growing up with the internet, this potential law was their worst nightmare materialising. Even though the Cyber Security Law ended up being discarded, the military succeeded with its announcement in putting a damper on people’s willingness to use social media for resistance activities. Furthermore, while the law itself was not enacted, several elements of the law have been included in additions and alterations to other laws, giving the military similar opportunities to surveil and charge activists for their online activities.
The state-owned/military-controlled media have continued to intimidate people by releasing warrant lists of celebrities, activists and civil servants. The military has relentlessly charged anti-coup activists under Section 505-A of the Penal Code, which was amended shortly after the coup to criminalise those against the regime. Based on the people apprehended and charged under the provision of the law, it is clear that the military is going after individuals with a large number of followers on social media who are known to be posting anti-regime and revolutionary content. Interestingly, these warrant lists occasionally contain random ordinary people, stoking the public’s fears that no one is safe and anyone may find themselves in the military’s limelight.
Figure 33: A screenshot of a 505-A warrant list. (Source: Ei Thinzar Maung)
State and military-controlled media release a constant stream of propaganda pieces, warning people not to be involved in the Civil Disobedience Movement or demonstrations. In one case, a propaganda piece addressing the youth issued a stern warning to those who were planning to participate in known upcoming anti-coup demonstrations. The warnings were very detailed and specifically mentioned that there would be a likelihood of protesters getting shot in the head. The propaganda segment was aired on 26 March, the day before Armed Forces Day, which did in fact turn out to be one of the deadliest days since the coup, with over one hundred civilians killed in multiple townships and cities across the country.
Figure 34: A message stating that participating in the protests has a risk of getting shot. (Source: Khit Thit Media)
Aiming to instil fear among protesters, the military released or leaked pictures of protesters and activists in custody. For instance, the military released pictures of young people who were detained and accused them of bombings in Yankin Township in Yangon (Figure 35). In these photos, the accused showed clear signs of abuse, which the military intentionally highlighted and publicised to show the potential consequences of their involvement in anti-coup movements.
Figure 35: The military released photos of detained activists highlighting the abuse they received in custody. (Source: Cape Diamond)
The pictures of famous actor Paing Takhon and activist Wai Moe Naing were leaked in a similar manner on social media while they were detained. The military knowingly crafted their propaganda messages around the pictures even though they simultaneously incriminated themselves by exposing the extent of human right violations at the interrogation centres.
Figure 36: Leaked pictures of activist Wai Moe Naing and celebrity Paing Takhon in custody. (Source: Khit Thit Media; Cover Academy)
With the surge of armed resistance in recent months, the military has shifted its focus of applying scare tactics to potential PDF members. For instance, the military has released pictures of arrested PDF members along with their weapons.
Figure 37: The military’ release of the pictures of PD arrested PDF members (Source: Myawaddy Web Portal)
One of the military’s most horrific scare and shock tactics is the public display of abuse and death. As the protests have continued, the military and security forces have gradually become less discreet in terms of what happens to activists when they are arrested. More and more cases of people being tortured to death have emerged over the last few months.
In some cases, the military has tortured individuals until their bodies became distorted and unrecognisable, only to return them afterwards to their families. Zaw Myat Lin, an NLD member who had been in charge of Suu Vocational Institute in Shwe Pyi Thar Township, suffered this tragic fate after being arrested and tortured to death. His dead body was returned the following morning, badly disfigured. The military uses this extreme scare and shock tactic to keep people away from the anti-regime movements. In exchange for its reputation and accountability, the junta council is willing to scare people by exposing their atrocities and blatantly disregarding human rights.
Figure 38: A news piece about the death of Zaw Myat Lin, who appeared to be severely tortured. (Source: Khit Thit Media)
The military also imposed the death penalty on 19 people from North Okkalapa Township in Yangon, and the news of their sentences was elaborated on in state media. Although the death penalty is included in Myanmar’s penal code, there have been no executions in the past three decades. This escalation to wilfully use one of the most severe forms of legal punishment also represents another form of signalling to the public that there are severe consequences to resisting the regime.
Figure 39: A news piece about death penalty on state media. (Source: Radio Free Asia)
While the military, as an institution, mostly applies their scare and shock tactics through classic communication channels such as mainstream media and official social media accounts, military supporters and soldiers have also become accustomed to threatening protesters and the general public on social media. TikTok in particular has become a platform for soldiers and police officers to practice their own scare tactics.
Figure 40: A soldier threatening to shoot if he sees someone on the street during the curfew hours. (Source: Fortify Rights)
We are still in the early days of a historic new era for Myanmar. It is therefore premature to say if the military’s propaganda efforts have been successful in swaying the general public’s view. However, it might be that the military’s propaganda, both through its state-controlled media channels and through social media, is targeted mostly towards a minority of the population who are either already pro-military or have some sympathy with the military, and therefore misses its mark.
In the leadup to the coup in December 2020, many non-NLD politicians made public assertions that the 2020 elections had many irregularities and that the NLD appointed Union Election Commission had disenfranchised many voters – especially ethnic minorities. Whereas the protest movement very quickly grew beyond simply supporting the NLD, many of the propaganda tropes from the pro-military side still frame the main villains as a vague amalgamation of the NLD, 88 Generation activists and, more recently, the CRPH and NUG.
For the military to gain more support than it currently has from a small minority of the population, their propaganda will need to belittle the protest movement as something orchestrated by a small group of extremists with nefarious goals and foreign backing, instead of a popular movement that enjoys support from all walks of life. Success in convincing Tatmadaw supporters to change sides and support the anti-coup movement will also depend on whether they will come to realise that the resistance does not stem from an extremist fringe, but it is actually a movement that reflects the desires of the vast majority of the population.
Figure 41: A tweet highlighting the importance of commitment from all walks of life. (Source: Kim Joliffe)
To better understand the networks supporting the military and enforcing the military’s narratives on social media, the project has tracked approximately 250 public groups known to frequently share pro-military content. Content from the groups was scraped to analyse sources of information used in posts and linkages between key actors in the networks.
During the first six months of the coup, the monitored accounts and groups linked to a total number of 27,516 different websites, Facebook pages, profiles and groups. When visualised (as in Figure 42 below), it is clear that the monitored accounts and groups are part of a wider network with some accounts and groups playing particularly dominant roles. The density of the cluster in the middle of the visualisation is a result of the many connections (so-called edges) between the different actors in the networks. The density would probably be even higher if the project had also been able to track links from groups and accounts not on the monitored list to the monitored groups and accounts.
Some of the most active accounts and groups also function as “hubs” or “brokers” to other clusters of accounts. However, as CrowdTangle’s privacy rules make it impossible to see more than the actual linkages between nodes in the networks, it is difficult to decipher what lies behind the link. It could just as well be a critique of a post or a disagreement with another group or person.
Figure 42: Data visualisation of the pro-military online ecosystem. The green dots (called nodes) each represent one of the 250 groups or accounts the project has been monitoring. The orange nodes are external websites, and the purple nodes are other Facebook groups, pages and accounts. Each grey line represents a link (an edge), meaning that the monitored group or account has linked to either another Facebook page, profile or account or an external website.
When filtering the data to identify the most popular sources that the monitored groups and accounts linked to, a different image emerges (see Figure 43). Here it becomes even more clear how interlinked the network is, although there are still nodes with less connections to the wider network.
Figure 43: A filtered version of the network in Figure 42, where only sources that had been linked to more than 100 times throughout the network appear. The filtering showed that among those sources, 536 of them were sources within Facebook, while 43 were external websites. As in figure 42, the green nodes represent the monitored accounts and groups, the purple nodes accounts and groups within Facebook and the orange nodes external websites. The size of the dots indicates the number of posts that contain links to the respective source.
Scrutiny of the 579 sources linked to more than 100 times among the monitored accounts and groups showed that Facebook pages of media outlets such as Khit Thit News, Mizzima Daily, RFA Burmese and DVBTVNews were among the top 10 pages linked to during the six months of monitoring. However, non-media Facebook pages also feature quite prominently in the top 50, and taken together, the number of links to the non-media pages vastly outnumber the links to media pages. When looking at sources outside of Facebook that were linked to, they consist of less than a tenth of the number of internal Facebook links. Independent news media websites are also not prominently linked to – something that is not necessarily surprising in Myanmar where media rely on Facebook to distribute content. However, aggregator and casual news media sites (celebrity, lifestyle, etc) do feature prominently, alongside YouTube. The tree map below in Figure 44 shows the relative hierarchy between the different sources.
Figure 44: Tree map of the sources linked to more than 100 times by the 250 monitored Facebook groups and accounts in the project. The size of the square shows its popularity. The bigger it is, the more links it has gotten from the monitored groups and accounts.
While the tree map provides a picture of the popularity of sources as an aggregate of the first six months of the coup, a break down month-by-month shows fluctuations over time. Most interestingly, it shows how the independent media sources have become less popular over time while new emerging sources both within Facebook and outside of Facebook are gaining prominence. In contrast to the independent media sources, these emerging sources are pro-military in nature, either because they themselves are popular pro-military Facebook groups or accounts or because they belong to the emerging field of semi-journalistic, pro-military media outlets.
The bump chart below shows the top 20 sources over the first six months following the coup. The horizontal axis shows the months from February 2021 to July 2021, and the vertical axis indicates the rank of the source, starting with the most linked to source at the top (rank = 1) to the 20th most linked to source at the bottom (rank = 20). Only sources that have stayed in the top 20 for at least two months within the six-month period since the coup have been included in the chart. The trend lines are colour coded to show green lines for pro-military sources, blue for independent media sources, red for anti-coup sources and yellow for non-political sources.
Figure 45: Bump chart of external webpages, Facebook pages, profiles and groups that are most linked to from the monitored groups and accounts. The chart above shows how the top 20 sources have been positioned over the course of the first six months following the coup. Only sources that have stayed in the top 20 for more than one month have been included.
When looking at the categories separately, the trends become even more clear. Independent media sources were the most linked to in the earlier months of the coup, but they have generally been dropping in the rankings from month to month, especially in July.
When it comes to pro-military sources in the top 20, initially public pages took the top positions, but as Facebook has taken action to take down these pages due to community guidelines, private groups are now getting far more links. Unfortunately, due to privacy rules, it is not possible to track these group as it is not possible to scrape data from private groups and pages, but in the last few months, anecdotally, the project has observed that a lot of pro-military content has shifted to private groups and pages. And yet, pro-military public pages are making a comeback – now to a large degree branded as media outlets. Among them are pages such as PeopleMedia.MM, localnewshwepyitaw, luduperspectivenews and 97Media. While they appear to report the news, most content is framed from pro-military viewpoints.
