Conclusion

Monitoring social media in Myanmar since the 1 February coup has provided some unique perspectives on the conflict and highlighted some of the key challenges of information and communication structures in the country. As a population that until fairly recently only had access to a limited number of controlled sources of information and has experienced a massive boom in access to information channels and communication technologies, the Myanmar people today not only have to navigate a conflict situation and a pandemic but also a muddled information landscape full of contradictory information with actors deliberately trying to deceive them. Although some people have become more accustomed to using social media and are aware of the pitfalls and dangers on the platforms, for many, social media is still unknown territory and a necessary evil as it has become increasingly difficult to get access to independent media sources. To get information, connect with friends and loved ones and potentially participate in the ongoing revolution, social media is needed.

The military was from the outset known to be very familiar with social media and, combined with their regular propaganda efforts, was expected to do what it could to influence the situation and promote its own narratives to claim legitimacy of the coup and crackdown of protests and NLD supporters. Analyses of the military’s propaganda efforts show that it has relied on a combination of old tactics and new approaches. There is clear evidence of the military retracing the steps of previous actions, from the scare and shock tactics employed in 1988, to the social media blackouts employed in Rakhine state following the Rohingya crisis in 2017. Furthermore, the military has, along with supporters, done their utmost to influence narratives through classic propaganda and diversion tactics and new online disinformation strategies. Although social media platforms such as Facebook had removed many military accounts and groups in the early days of the coup, it did not get rid of the problem; it only moved the culprits into closed fora and onto other platforms.

A look into the networks of pro-military Facebook accounts and groups showed how interlinked they are and how they rely on the same sources of information. The networks are gradually closing around themselves as they increasingly rely on their own trusted sources of information among pro-military media and groups and less on independent media. This development mirrors the polarisation of Myanmar society that is taken place where the frontlines are being drawn sharply based on which side of the conflict people belong to.

In contrast to the military, the protest movements and their usage of social media to organise and express their views is marked by a radical departure from the usual tenets of Myanmar cultural and societal norms, such as showing obedience to elders, lack of sympathy for the plight of ethnic minorities and misogyny resulting from the dominance of dogmatic elements in Bamar-Buddhist beliefs. Although the roots of this new blossoming of political awareness and action can be traced to the changes that have taken place in Myanmar society due to the reforms of the previous decade, the coup has brought them to the foreground of what is now a revolutionary new era in Myanmar’s history. As during the Arab Spring, social media in Myanmar has become an important tool for the different protest movements to rally around common causes, bring attention to the situation in Myanmar and organise themselves. However, as the military amped up their crackdown of protests and people’s hopes of a peaceful solution and international interventions dwindled, so changed the protest movements. We are currently observing a transition from protests to armed conflict and the tone on social media is getting equally harsher with people seeking revenge on soldiers and military supporters – even from people who before believed in peaceful solutions. Again, this development mirrors the polarisation of society and raises concerns about long-term consequences for hoped-for future reconciliation processes.

Finally, the recent surge in Covid-19 over the summer months has added additional layers to the conflict. With a country in disarray, infections have been out of control and people have very limited possibilities for getting treatments, resulting in serious illnesses and deaths, though the real death toll is underreported. Not surprisingly, the military has used the pandemic for propaganda and oppression purposes. However, it has not proven fully successful as even military-supporters have begun raising questions about the military’s capabilities in handling the situation.

Recommendations

Having monitored and followed the situation on Myanmar social media in the first six months following the coup, the people behind the Myanmar Social Media Monitoring Project have compiled a list of recommendations for the international community, media and tech companies to consider moving forward. There are currently no signs of the conflict ending, and as tensions mount and people become more frustrated, so are tempers rising on social media. The tone, language and attacks are becoming more hostile and with even greater consequences for people’s lives and future reconciliation processes in Myanmar.

• Facebook and other social media platforms need to further acknowledge their responsibilities towards the Myanmar population and improve transparency on their practices with regard to content moderation, demotion and removal.

• Civil society and media need to look further into the polarisation of Myanmar society to understand the issue and raise awareness of the long-term consequences. In a similar manner, governments with development programmes in Myanmar should consider the issue and find ways to build bridges between the opposing sides in preparation for a future reconciliation process.

• The media needs to understand its responsibilities in the current conflict and strive to cover the situation in a conflict-sensitive manner by following ethical principles and focusing on public interest journalism.

• Governments and international organisations with mandates related to media, tech and democracy need to develop frameworks for social media platforms. At this point, it has become evident that self-regulation is far from enough to combat the spread disinformation and hate speech on social media. Particularly in crisis situations such as the one unfolding in Myanmar, tech companies are either not able or willing to put in the effort required to change digital infrastructures and algorithms. The international community needs to step up and find solutions to hold the tech companies accountable and force them to be transparent about their practices.