Executive summary

The Myanmar Social Media Insights Project launched following the military coup on 1 February 2021 with a purpose of documenting and analysing activities in the Myanmar social media sphere.

With a military known to use social media in their propaganda efforts and a Myanmar population having grown accustomed to relying on the internet for information and communication practices, the people behind the project knew that social media would become a battlefield of its own, with the military trying to dominate conversations and steer narratives surrounding the coup in their favour via old-school propaganda efforts and new disinformation methods. Furthermore, social media has become a lens for perspectives on offline activities and public sentiments – particularly as access to reliable information is scarce with independent media being heavily restricted and journalists having to work underground.

This report presents findings from six months of documentation and analysis of social media activities in the Myanmar social media sphere. Through case examples it documents how the military on one side and the protest and resistance movements (including the civil disobedience movement) on the other side have used social media to amplify their messages and influence the situations unfolding across the country. Below are some of the key findings of the report:

The military relies on old practices and new tools: The Myanmar military has clearly based their social media strategy on past experiences and are doing what they can to influence public sentiments and legitimise the coup. They rely on a combination of classic propaganda tactics (such as framing stories and events to their own benefit) and newer disinformation manoeuvres. In terms of the latter, there is evidence of the military trying to strategically inundate social media with false information and stories to create confusion and instil fear among the population or divert attention to other stories, hurting their overall attempts at creating a cohesive narrative around their claim to power. The military has not only a number of news media outlets to fit the purpose but also military personnel and supporters that can help reinforce their narratives and amplify them to larger audiences on social media.

A new generation of activists has emerged on social media: The protest movement differs significantly from protest movements of the past by being made up of a variety of groups and not having a unified leadership. This makes the movement less vulnerable compared to past movements, but it also makes it more difficult for the movement to speak with a unified voice. Social media platforms have become important outlets for communicating and rallying around common causes. As such, social media behaviours in Myanmar have changed significantly over the course of the six months following the coup. There was a very visible, abrupt shift from one day to the next when the coup occurred with conversations and profiles instantaneously becoming political. Although the tone on social media has found a new normal of sorts, the coup, the protests and the actions of the military are still present all over Myanmar social media. Those with an active presence (not least classic influencers) have had to make an active choice in terms of which side they belong to. For many, the coup has catapulted them into a whole new area of work as activists and spokespersons for a movement.

The conflict is escalating: The situation is moving into a new stage, with protesters increasingly recognising that no assistance is coming from the international community and that peaceful protests matter little to the military. As a consequence, the conflict is escalating with young people taking up arms and receiving combat training from ethnic armed forces. This shift is very visible on social media where influencers/active social media users turned activists during the protests are now increasingly also turning into revolutionary soldiers.

Filter bubbles/echo chambers make it difficult to build bridges between fractions: The polarisation currently characterising Myanmar’s society is clearly visible on social media. Network analysis of social media shows how the protest movements and supporters of the military belong to their own filter bubbles, with very limited cross-over between them. The two groups have almost no interaction and mainly reinforce their own narratives and perceptions of the situation. However, during periods of uncertainty, when reliable information is even more scarce and rumours run wild, small windows open and mis- and disinformation spread across the entire Myanmar social media universe.

Covid-19 is used as a tool of oppression: Finally, the recent surge in Covid-19 in the country has intensified the conflicts in a new way. The military, not accepting the scale of the pandemic’s hold on the country, is on one side trying to keep up appearances and on the other side blaming the CDM for the surge in infections and deaths. Furthermore, the pandemic has proven to be a useful tool for the military in both their propaganda efforts and as a means to further oppress oppositional voices. However, the military’s strategy could backfire, as even loyal supporters of the military have begun to criticise their lack of control of the pandemic.

Although a new normal of sorts has established itself in Myanmar in the months following the coup and international media attention has shifted to other hot spots across the globe, the situation remains as troublesome and worrying as it did in February. As the tone grows harsher on social media and polarisation in the country worsens by the day, peaceful solutions seem illusive.

The Myanmar Social Media Monitoring Project ends the report with recommendations for action that may help mitigate some of the identified problems and developments. While many social media platforms have begun realising their responsibilities in ensuring safe and conducive online dialogues, their interventions have limited impact compared to the grandness of the issues. Interventions at higher levels will be equally necessary to ensure that social media does not further contribute negatively to the conflict.